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Cutting Cops Too Much Slack
WAYNE A. LOGAN *

Police officers can make mistakes, which, for better or worse, the U.S.
Supreme Court has often seen fit to forgive. Police, for instance, can make
mistakes of fact when assessing whether circumstances justify the seizure
of an individual 1 or search of a residence; 2 they can even be mistaken about
the identity of those they arrest. 3 This essay examines yet another, arguably
more significant context where police mistakes are forgiven: when they
seize a person based on their misunderstanding of what a law prohibits.
Although such a seizure might seem the epitome of unreasonable behavior proscribed by the Fourth Amendment, 4 the Supreme Court has disagreed. In 1979, in Michigan v. DeFillippo, 5 the Court’s thinking on the
question started out modestly enough when a six-member majority concluded that police can arrest for violation of a law later deemed unconstitutional. “Society,” the Court reasoned, “would be ill-served if its police took
it upon themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled to enforcement.” 6 In 2004, in Devenpeck v. Alford, 7 the
Court went a step farther, unanimously holding that police can arrest an individual for conduct that is not prohibited by law, so long as facts known to
the officer afford probable cause to believe that another lawful basis to arrest exists. 8
DeFillippo and Devenpeck, while debatable on their doctrinal merits, at
*
Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of
Law. Thanks to Andrew Ferguson, David Logan, Tracey Maclin, Richard Re, and Chris
Slobogin for their helpful comments.
1.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (arrest); see also, e.g.,
United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006) (investigatory stop).
2.
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (whether a third party has authority to consent to search of premises); Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 88 (1987)
(whether residence searched is that specified in warrant).
3.
Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
4.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
5.
443 U.S. 31 (1979).
6.
Id. at 38.
7.
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
8.
Id. at 153–55.
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least shared a common virtue: in both cases the seizures were somehow legally justified when they occurred. This past Term, however, in Heien v.
North Carolina, 9 the Court took a quantum leap in the latitude it affords
police, validating a traffic stop based on an officer’s misunderstanding of
law when no other legal basis justified the stop.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts proclaimed that “[t]o be
reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for
some mistakes by government officials,” 10 whether regarding fact or law. 11
Officers in the field, he reasoned, “deserve a margin of error” for the often
“quick decision[s]” they must make. 12 Even though the officer in Heien
wrongly believed that the law required two (not one) operable brake lights
on a car, his mistake was a reasonable one given the law’s purported uncertainty, justifying the seizure (and admission of contraband later discovered). 13
Surprisingly, Heien was met with near silence by the nation’s editorial
pages 14 and inspired only a single dissent, by Justice Sotomayor. 15 Justice
Sotomayor condemned her colleagues’ blithe equating of factual determinations by police and their understanding of the laws that they enforce. Factual determinations, she noted, are probabilistic by their very nature, requiring officers to utilize their training and experience to make often quick deductions about possible criminal misconduct. 16 “The same cannot be said
about legal exegesis,” Justice Sotomayor observed. “‘[T]he notion that the
law is definite and knowable’ sits at the foundation of our legal system. And

9.
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
10. Id. at 536.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 539.
13. Id. at 540.
14. Among the nation’s leading newspapers, only the Los Angeles Times published
an editorial critical of Heien. See Editorial, Ignorance of the Law Isn’t an Acceptable Defense, Even for Police, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2014, http://www.latimes.com/local/crime/laed-ignorance-of-the-law-supreme-court-20141216-story.html.
15. Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 542 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Kagan, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, concurred “in full” in the result, noting that “[i]f the statute is genuinely
ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work,
then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.” Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring, joined
by Ginsburg, J.). According to the concurrence, the statute at issue “pose[d] a quite difficult
question of interpretation,” and the officer’s “judgment, although overturned, had much to
recommend it.” Id. at 542.
16. Id. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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it is courts, not officers, that are in the best position to interpret the laws.” 17
“What matters . . . [is] the rule of law—not an officer’s conception of the
rule of law, and not even an officer’s reasonable misunderstanding about
the law, but the law.” 18
Condoning reasonable mistakes of law by police, Justice Sotomayor further noted, undermines the critically important law-clarification function of
courts. A court now need only determine whether an officer’s mistake was
reasonable, avoiding the need to conclusively interpret the law in question. 19 “This result is bad for citizens, who need to know their rights and
responsibilities, and it is bad for police who would benefit from clearer direction.” 20 “One wonders,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “how a citizen seeking to be law-abiding and to structure his or her behavior to avoid these
invasive, frightening, and humiliating encounters could do so.” 21
While the foregoing points are spot-on, Justice Sotomayor failed to fully
catalog the difficulties presented by Heien. While it is certainly true that
Heien obviates the need for courts to clarify uncertain laws, it also affects
the work of legislatures. By imposing a standard-like rule of reasonableness,
which functions only to expand (and never contract) the prohibitory scope
of a law, 22 Heien allocated law-making power to police. 23 Empowering police in this way not only raises separation of powers concerns; 24 it will also
undermine the quality of laws actually codified by legislatures. Lawmakers,
perhaps already predisposed to enact broad provisions to facilitate law enforcement, 25 will now have even less reason to avoid textual imprecision
17. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,
418 (1981)).
18. Id. at 542.
19. Id. at 544.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. As Anthony Amsterdam long ago noted, use of a reasonableness standard can
be “splendid in its flexibility, [and] awful in its unintelligibility, unadministrability, unenforcibility and general ooziness.” Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 415 (1974).
23. See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003) (condoning police mistakes of law allows police to “sweep behavior into [a] statute which the
authors of the statutes may have had in mind but failed to put into the plain language of the
statute”).
24. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 452, 456–61 (2010) (discussing institutional allocation of authority to legislatures to identify and codify criminal law norms).
25. See Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 365–66 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting);
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because Heien allows police to make interpretive mistakes in their application. 26
The resulting legal indeterminacy will be especially problematic with
malum prohibitum offenses, such as that at issue in Heien. Before Heien,
discretionary enforcement of laws regulating such offenses was marked by
what Professor Bill Stuntz called a de facto “kind of lawlessness.” 27 So long
as they had probable cause or reasonable suspicion that an offense occurred,
police could (but need not) seize an alleged violator, 28 even if they did so
as a pretext to investigate other criminal activity. 29 After Heien, this authority remains (as the circumstances in Heien itself highlight 30), but it has been
complemented by a de jure kind of lawlessness. Whereas historically police
had reason to narrowly interpret laws 31 for fear that a mistake of law would
trigger the exclusionary rule, 32 they now have strategic reason to expan-

William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505,
534–35 (2001).
26. And police trainers, mindful that reasonable mistakes are forgiven, will now
have less incentive to elucidate perhaps unclear laws.
27. Stuntz, supra note 25, at 597.
28. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 391 (2009)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“[A] basic principle of the Fourth Amendment [is] that law enforcement officials can enforce with the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective
of the perceived importance of any of those rules.”).
29. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
30. The officer in Heien admitted that he was looking for “criminal indicators” in
passing cars, decided to pursue Heien’s vehicle because the driver had his “hands at a 10
and 2 position looking straight ahead,” and after following the vehicle used the alleged
brake light violation to initiate a stop. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 18, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-604_pet_reply
.authcheckdam.pdf. The officer was thus not faced with what the Heien majority later
called the need to make a “quick decision.” Id.
31. See, e.g., Malcomson v. Scott, 23 N.W. 166, 168 (Mich. 1885) (“An officer of
justice is bound to know what the law is, and if the facts on which he proceeds, if true,
would not justify action under the law, he is a wrong-doer.”); see also WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 86 (1965) (noting traditional
view that police should “employ a very strict construction [of statutes], particularly in
doubtful cases”); United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2013) (expressing “hope that [an officer] would clarify his understanding of any unclear provision
before bringing the full force of the law upon an unsuspecting citizen”).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir. 2006); United States
v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006); State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 824
(Minn. 2004); State v. Lacsella, 60 P.3d 975, 981 (Mont. 2002).
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sively interpret laws in the hope that their mistake will later be deemed reasonable, allowing for the “bigger” busts that they very often are after. 33
The impact of this shift will not be felt by individuals alone. Rather, as
Justice Sotomayor recognized, Heien will have broader “human consequences—including . . . for communities and for their relationships with the
police.” 34 Allowing police officers, the public face and embodiment of the
law, 35 to flout the laws they enforce surely will do nothing to instill community confidence in the fairness and competence of police. 36 Nor will such
confidence be served by the troubling asymmetry that Heien creates: going
forward, reasonable mistakes of law by police will be excused, but those of
citizens generally will not. 37 To the Heien majority, the asymmetry had only
“rhetorical appeal,” 38 because mistake of law doctrine is all about criminal
liability:
Just as an individual generally cannot escape criminal liability based on a mistaken understanding of the law, so
too the government cannot impose criminal liability based
on a mistaken understanding of the law. . . . But just because mistakes of law cannot justify either the imposition
or avoidance of criminal liability, it does not follow that
they cannot justify an investigatory stop. 39

The petitioner in Heien, however, did not challenge a ticket or conviction for a brake-light violation. Rather, he challenged an investigatory
33. See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Erie and Federal Criminal Courts, 63 VAND. L REV.
1243, 1248 (2010) (describing police use of traffic stops as bases for drug interdiction).
34. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 544 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
35. See ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 175 (1971) (“The legal
exercise of police authority reinforces the right of police to use it, while its illegal exercise
undermines the broader acceptance of the authority as legitimate.”).
36. As the procedural justice literature attests, the public’s perception of the fairness
and legitimacy of police can negatively affect community willingness to cooperate with
and defer to police authority. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 78 (2014); Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231 (2008).
37. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §13.01 (6th
ed., 2012).
38. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
39. Id.
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stop 40—a Fourth Amendment seizure that the Court somehow felt justified
in treating as a safe harbor for mistakes of law. Why police should be allowed to err in favor of legal over-inclusiveness when stopping a vehicle,
while motorists are not forgiven their mistakes of legal under-inclusiveness
when they drive one, remains unclear. It would appear that the Court was
motivated in part by the view that being detained by police is a trivial event.
As Justice Sotomayor observed, however, a police seizure can be an “invasive, frightening, and humiliating” experience. 41
Again, however, Justice Sotomayor failed to fully capture the significance of the majority’s decision to expand police authority to execute stops.
When police execute a traffic stop, for instance, they can order the driver
and any passengers to exit the vehicle 42 and can ask a barrage of unrelated
questions intended to elicit incriminating information. 43 If an officer believes a weapon is present, she can conduct a frisk, 44 which the Court has
described as “a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security.” 45 Or the officer can simply ask for consent to search, as occurred in
Heien, which need not be accompanied by any advisement that the request
can be refused. 46
The Court’s safe harbor, while bad enough in itself, has a troublesome
capacity to expand in at least two important respects. First, even though
Heien concerned a misdemeanor traffic offense, the principle it endorsed—
as with Fourth Amendment doctrine more generally 47—applies to enforcement of laws concerning serious and non-serious offenses alike. For citizens, this means that the risk of being unlawfully seized will grow as already
overstuffed state, local, and federal legal codes continue to expand. Second,
Heien’s reasoning will likely be applied beyond the context of investigative
stops. Already, at least one court has invoked Heien to validate an arrest

40. Id.
41. Id. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
42. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (passengers); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977) (driver).
43. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100–01 (2005).
44. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S 323, 334 (2009).
45. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1968).
46. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002).
47. See William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the
Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 875 (2001).
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based on an officer’s mistake of law. 48 When this occurs, individuals experience an even greater degree of physical coercion 49 and a complete
search, 50 possibly of their naked bodies. 51
In the final analysis, the result in Heien perhaps should not come as a
surprise given the Court’s view of the burdens citizens can be rightfully
expected to bear when assessing Fourth Amendment reasonableness. The
calculus was on notable display in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 52 when the
Court upheld the arrest of a motorist for failing to wear a seatbelt, which the
majority acknowledged to be a “pointless indignity” and “gratuitous humiliation[] imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely
poor judgment.” 53 In so deciding, the Court refused to draw a constitutional
distinction between jailable and non-jailable offenses, stating that “we cannot expect every police officer to know the details of frequently complex
penalty schemes.” 54 It also rejected adoption of a “simple tie breaker for the
police to follow in the field: if in doubt, do not arrest.” 55
Heien likewise deferred to the enforcement challenges faced by police,
prompting Justice Sotomayor to wonder “why an innocent citizen should be
made to shoulder the burden of being seized whenever the law may be susceptible to an interpretive question.” 56 By sacrificing legality concerns on
the altar of Fourth Amendment reasonableness, the Court has sent a powerful message: that government can now enact imprecise laws and then enforce them “against a defendant.” 57 Being seized by police when you have
done nothing wrong is now simply something that must be tolerated, much
like the “pointless indignity” and “gratuitous humiliation[]” suffered by the
48. See People v. Campuzano, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 592 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super.
Ct. 2015) (upholding arrest based on officer’s misinterpretation of ordinance prohibiting
operation of a bicycle on a sidewalk “fronting” a business).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (describing arrest as “a serious personal intrusion regardless of whether the person
seized is guilty or innocent”).
50. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). In the auto context, an
arrest can allow police to search the arrestee’s car, Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343
(2009), and impound and inventory its contents, Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374
(1987).
51. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1523 (2012).
52. 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
53. Id. at 346–47.
54. Id. at 348.
55. Id. at 350.
56. Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 546 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
57. United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1278 (11th Cir. 2003).
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motorist in Atwater. 58
Fifty years ago, Professor Wayne LaFave wrote that “[i]t is obviously
important to determine how . . . criminal statutes should be interpreted by
law enforcement personnel who must decide whether to arrest.” 59 Until
Heien, the baseline was clear enough: police mistakes of law, even those
based on reasonable misunderstanding, were condemned. 60 With Heien, the
Supreme Court has taken us on a different path, one far more deferential to
police than the citizens that they take an oath to protect and serve. Amid
troubling reports of police overreach in Ferguson, Missouri and elsewhere, 61 allowing police to seize individuals when they have done nothing
wrong is a very regrettable development indeed. For citizens like Sandra
Bland in Texas, already uncertain about what a “lawful order” from police
might mean, life on the streets will now be even more unpredictable and
problematic. 62

58. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001).
59. LAFAVE, supra note 31, at 85.
60. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
61. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default
/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report_1
.pdf.
62. Orin Kerr, Sandra Bland and the ‘Lawful Order’ Problem, WASH. POST, July
23, 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/07/23/sandra-bland-and-the-lawful-order-problem.

